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Abstract The pure exchange model is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value, yet
equilibrium predictions and models of price adjustment for this model remained untested prior to
the experiment reported in this paper. With the exchange economy replicated several times, prices
and allocations converge sharply to the competitive equilibrium in continuous double auction (CDA)
trading. Convergence is evaluated by comparing the extent of price adjustment within each market
replication (or trading period) to the extent of adjustment across trading periods: most observed
price adjustment occurs within trading periods, so price adjustment data are evaluated with the
Hahn process model (Hahn and Negishi [1962]), which is a disequilibrium model of within-period
trades. Estimation demonstrates that the model is consistent with observed price paths within each
period of the exchange economy. The model is augmented with an additional assumption – based on
observations from this experiment – that the initial trade price in period t+1 is randomly drawn from
the interval between the minimum and maximum trade prices in period t. The estimated within-period
adjustment rule, combined with this across-period adjustment rule, generates price paths similar to
data from an experiment session.
Keywords: Competitive equilibrium, disequilibrium dynamics, continuous double auction, experi-
mental economics, exchange economy, Hahn process, neoclassical theory of value, tatonnement, unit
root tests
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1 Introduction
The pure exchange model forms the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value. Assessment
of its price and allocation predictions is important in microeconomic theory as well as in much
applied economics that rests on a general equilibrium foundation. This paper reports a direct
experimental test of the competitive equilibrium predictions and price dynamics in an exchange
economy with strong income eﬀects. Income eﬀects pose a challenge for the price discovery process
in a general equilibrium model. Resource ownership is speciﬁed in a general equilibrium model, so
the wealth of an agent depends on prices, and wealth aﬀects demand. Except in the case of quasi-
linear preferences, a disequilibrium trade alters the wealth of each party to the trade from their
wealth in equilibrium. This alters agents’ demands, and hence alters the equilibrium price of the
economy that remains after the disequilibrium trade. Consequently, equilibrium may be much more
diﬃcult to reach in a market in which agents have income eﬀects than in the experimental markets
previously studied. This is not merely a subtle issue in general equilibrium theory. This situation
arises in international trade. The large recent increase in oil prices produces a large transfer of
income from oil importers to exporters. The process of price adjustment in the presence of income
eﬀects of this sort tells us how prices respond to altered market conditions. The question addressed
by the experiment in this paper is whether a simple general equilibrium economy with strong income
eﬀects can reach its competitive equilibrium, and if so, how that comes about. The test reported
here demonstrates that prices and allocations do converge to the competitive equilibrium, but the
process of convergence is subtler that in previous experiments that do not involve income eﬀects.
In principle, an experimental test of this model is straightforward. Smith [1976, 1982] developed
a theory of induced utility which applies directly to this problem. The experimenter speciﬁes a
utility function for each agent in an exchange economy. The value of an agent’s induced utility
function at his ﬁnal allocation determines his payoﬀ. Any of several exchange mechanisms could
meditate trades. Due to its robust performance properties and its operational simplicity, the
continuous double auction (CDA) is a natural choice. A partial test of this type – with induced
utility functions for buyers and schedules of induced costs for sellers – is reported in Williams,
Smith, Ledyard, and Gjerstad [2000]. Prices and allocations in their experiment converge, albeit
with a slight price bias. The test reported in this paper combines induced utilities for sellers
and buyers, and unlike previous general equilibrium experiments, such as Lian and Plott [1998]
or Anderson, Plott, Shimomura, and Granat [2004], the experiment uses a commodity money so
that the absolute price level is determined, and the market environment is tightly linked to the
exchange economy. Moreover, unlike previous general equilibrium experiments, all agents in the
experiment reported in this paper have strictly quasi-concave utility functions that exhibit strong
income eﬀects, so the experiment provides a strenuous test of competitive equilibrium predictions.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 2
A competitive market environment is created with six sellers and six buyers, each with an
induced utility function over two commodities. One commodity is speciﬁed as the numeraire:
prices for the non-numeraire commodity are stated in terms of a number of units of the numeraire.
Buyers initially hold only the numeraire commodity in their endowment, and sellers initially hold
only the non-numeraire commodity in their endowment.1 Each experiment session consists of either
12 or 15 identical replications of the exchange economy.2 In each of these replications (or trading
periods), the sellers post oﬀer prices and the buyers post bid prices – denominated in units of the
numeraire commodity – for one unit of the other commodity. Exchange occurs when a seller and
a buyer agree on a number of units of the numeraire commodity that they will exchange for a unit
of the other commodity. Each agent may (and typically does) participate in several trades in each
trading period.
Trades strongly support competitive equilibrium price and allocation predictions in this exper-
iment. By the ﬁnal period in four sessions, allocations and prices were very near the competitive
equilibrium allocation and price: the allocation diﬀered from the competitive equilibrium allocation
by less than 3% (measured as the ratio of the distance between the ﬁnal allocations and the equilib-
rium allocations to the distance between the initial endowments and the equilibrium allocations).
In addition, the diﬀerence between the average ﬁnal period price and the equilibrium price was less
than 3.7% in each session and averaged less than 3.1%. Earnings as a percentage of equilibrium
earnings were closer yet: in the ﬁnal period they averaged 99.8%, which is higher than the typical
eﬃciency in a CDA experiment with unit costs for sellers and unit values for buyers.
In addition to conﬁrmation of convergence to competitive equilibrium, these experiment sessions
provide a unique opportunity to assess price dynamics in an exchange economy. In the CDA trades
are negotiated directly between sellers and buyers, trades typically occur at a variety of prices even
within a single trading period, and most trades occur out of equilibrium. These characteristics of the
trading process, rather than hindering investigation of price dynamics, facilitate their evaluation.
In order to shed light on this adjustment process, market dynamics are evaluated with two
price adjustment models. Across-period adjustment is evaluated with the price adjustment rule
from the tatonnement model. Although the price adjustment rule from the tatonnement model
is normally interpreted as an action by the ‘auctioneer’ in a Walrasian auction, it is nevertheless
useful as a diagnostic tool for evaluation of changes to average price across trading periods, even
1 The position of each subject in the experiment as either a buyer or a seller is of course a ﬁction: those labeled
‘buyer’ in the experiment because they purchase units of the non-numeraire commodity are also sellers of the numeraire
commodity; sellers of the non-numeraire commodity can also be viewed as buyers of the numeraire commodity.
2 The ﬁrst three sessions – all conducted on a single day – provided evidence that convergence is much slower in
this environment than in a market with induced costs and values, so the number of market replications was increased
for the fourth session.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 3
in a market that employs the CDA trading mechanism. Individual excess demand is a well-deﬁned
function of an agent’s current allocation and the market price, and market excess demand is the
sum of individual excess demands. Market excess demand at the average price in period t leads
under the tatonnement adjustment rule to a predicted change to the average price in period t + 1.
Consequently, we can use the price adjustment rule from tatonnement as a diagnostic tool, and
determine whether it describes period-to-period price adjustment well, even though the impetus to
these price changes diﬀers in the CDA from that in the Walrasian auction.
The tatonnement price adjustment rule is therefore used to evaluate convergence across market
periods, with the predicted average price in period t + 1 determined as ¯ p t+1 = ¯ p t + bZ(¯ p t) + ǫ t+1.
Under the null hypothesis of no price change in response to excess demand (b = 0), the process is a
random walk. The linear approximation to this adjustment equation, ¯ p t+1 = ¯ p t +β (p∗− ¯ p t)+ǫ t+1,
is examined with Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. These tests demonstrate that average price adjusts
across periods toward equilibrium, as predicted.
Evaluation of period-to-period average price adjustment though neglects the substantial within-
period price adjustment. In the “Hahn process” (Hahn and Negishi [1962]), the auctioneer an-
nounces a price as in tatonnement; traders respond by announcing excess demand. Unlike taton-
nement though, in this disequilibrium exchange model trade takes place if there is some exchange
compatible with announced excess demands. Then price adjusts in response to excess demand, as
in the tatonnement model, and the process is repeated at the new price. Proceeding iteratively,
the model predicts a path of prices within a trading period. The Hahn process model is used
to evaluate experiment data by comparing predicted within-period price adjustment to observed
within-period price adjustment from experiment sessions. As with tatonnement adjustment, Hahn
process adjustment is a random walk under the null hypothesis of no adjustment, so unit root
tests are applied to within-period trades as well. The Hahn process accounts for and adapts to
disequilibrium trades, and converges to a Pareto optimal allocation in each period. Its predicted
price path within a period t, augmented with a predicted initial price in period t + 1, eﬀectively
describes the evolution of prices both within and across trading periods.
When agents have income eﬀects, convergence is slower and subtler than in markets with in-
duced supply and demand which have no income eﬀects. In a market without income eﬀects, the
equilibrium price near the end of the period approximately equals the equilibrium price before trad-
ing begins. This simpliﬁes the learning problem since the end-of-period trades condition agents’
subsequent price expectations, so that prices quickly converge to the equilibrium. In a market
with income eﬀects though, when the price path diﬀers from the equilibrium price, the equilibrium
price by the end of the period may diﬀer substantially from the equilibrium price at the start of a
trading period. With replication of the market conditions across several trading periods though,
this diﬃculty is overcome. Prices within a trading period typically adjust toward the competitivePRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 4
equilibrium price, so that the price path in each period better approximates the CE price. Eventu-
ally prices and allocations stabilize in the vicinity of the equilibrium price and allocation. Although
price paths in markets with income eﬀects have diﬀerent characteristics than price paths in markets
without income eﬀects, both are consistent with the same adjustment process.
This paper progresses through the steps outlined above. Section 2 describes the economic
environment induced in the experiment sessions. Section 3 describes the CDA mechanism in the
exchange economy context. Section 4 evaluates experiment data for across-period convergence and
also compares across-period price adjustment to within-period price adjustment. Section 5 describes
the within-period price adjustment from the Hahn process model, augmented with a simple across-
period price adjustment rule. Section 6 reports Hahn process model parameter estimates and a
simulation of the adjustment process. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Economic environment
At the beginning of each trading period, each buyer is endowed with 1800 units of the numeraire
commodity (X), which is described to the buyer as currency. Buyers can use this numeraire com-
modity to purchase units of the commodity (Y ). Each seller is endowed with eighteen units of
the commodity, which can be sold individually to acquire units of the numeraire commodity. The
payoﬀ of agent i is determined from the value of the constant elasticity of substitution utility func-
tion ui(x, y) = ci ((ai x)ri + (bi y)ri)1/ri, where x is the ﬁnal allocation of currency (the numeraire
commodity X) and y is the ﬁnal allocation of the commodity (Y ) held by agent i at the end of a
trading period.3
In each period of an experiment session, each of six buyers (agent type B) has the same utility
function uB(x, y) and endowment ωB = (1800, 0); each of six sellers (agent type S) has the same
utility function uS(x, y) and endowment ωS = (0, 18). Table 1 shows the CES utility function
parameters and the endowments of sellers and buyers.
ci ai bi ri ωi
Sellers’ parameters (i = 2, 4, ..., 12) 0.256 2.982 109.89 −1 (0, 18)
Buyers’ parameters (i = 1, 3, ..., 11) 0.695 0.362 109.89 −1 (1800, 0)
Table 1: Sellers’ and buyers’ parameters.
With ρi = ri/(1 − ri), the excess demand for Y of agent i is
3 The parameter ci does not aﬀect the competitive equilibrium price or allocation, but it does aﬀect the utility
level attained by subject i, and is therefore a useful element of the utility inducement technique, since it permits the




























i (p|ωi) is the sum of individual ex-
cess demands.4 When parameters from table 1 are substituted into equation (2.1) and the resulting
individual excess demand functions are substituted into the market excess demand function, the
equilibrium price p∗ . = 91 is obtained as the solution to Z
Y
(p|ω) = 0. (In equilibrium, the market
for the numeraire commodity (X) then clears by Walras’ law.) Then p∗ = 91 is substituted into
equation (2.1) to determine the net trade of Y by agent i. Each seller has equilibrium allocation
(xS,yS) = (637,11); each buyer has equilibrium allocation (xB,yB) = (1163,7). The equilibrium
utility level for each agent is 189. With sellers identical to one another, and buyers identical to
each other, the economic environment can be displayed in an Edgeworth diagram, as in ﬁgure 3.
In order to implement an exchange economy experiment, each subject is provided with detailed
speciﬁcations of his objective and of the exchange institution. The next section describes the CDA
institution in the context of an exchange economy and describes the representation of the utility
inducement technique to subjects.
3 The continuous double auction (CDA)
In the CDA, any seller may submit an ask at any time during a trading period. An ask, which
is the seller’s current report of the fewest units of the numeraire commodity that he is willing to
accept for a unit of the commodity, is entered in the area on the seller’s screen display labeled
“Enter Ask,” as in ﬁgure 1. Similarly, a buyer’s bid, which represents her current report of the
most units of the numeraire commodity that she is willing to pay for a unit of the commodity,
may be submitted at any time. An ask placed at or below the current high bid generates a trade
at the bid price. A bid that meets or exceeds the current low ask yields a trade at the ask price.
A seller may make any number of asks, and may trade any number of units that is consistent
with his commodity endowment. Similarly, a buyer may make any number of bids, and may trade
any number of units that is consistent with her endowment of the numeraire commodity. Several
speciﬁc rules are implemented in the version of the CDA used in this experiment. Of these, the most
important is the “spread reduction rule,” which requires that each new ask is below the current
low ask and each new bid exceeds the current high bid. A seller has the option to remove any ask
that he has previously made, provided his request to remove the ask is received before it results in
4 Dependence of excess demand on endowments ωi or on interim allocations (xi, yi) is indicated because in the
Hahn process, price adjusts after each trade in response to excess demand at the current allocation. In Section 5, which
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a trade. Each seller is permitted a single ask in the market queue at any time. Any new ask by a
seller replaces his previous ask if he has one in the queue. Each ask is the unit price oﬀered for one
unit: multiple unit trades are not permitted. Analogous restrictions apply to each buyer’s bids.
Figure 1: Seller screen with elements of market institution.
During each period, a queue on the seller’s screen displays all current asks and bids (shown
as the “Market Queue” in ﬁgure 1); each buyer’s screen also displays both queues. When a seller
successfully enters an ask into the ask queue, he receives a conﬁrmation message in the “Messages”
area of the screen display. This ask also appears in the “Unit Ask” row of the “Trade Summary”
table, in the column that corresponds to the unit the seller has oﬀered for sale. Similarly, a buyer
receives a conﬁrmation message when she enters a bid into the bid queue, and also sees an update
to the appropriate cell in her Trade Summary table. When a seller and buyer complete a trade,
they both receive a conﬁrmation message, “Unit Price,” “Unit Proﬁt,” and “Total Proﬁt” ﬁgures
are recorded in their Trade Summary tables, and the price appears in the “Market Transaction
Prices” graph, which displays all trade prices from the current period. The trading phase of eachPRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 7
period lasts 180 seconds; a clock at the top of each agent’s screen shows the time remaining in the
current phase. Each of these elements of the market institution appears on a seller’s trading screen,
as in ﬁgure 1. Buyers have a similar trading screen.
Figure 2: Proﬁt calculator table and graph for seller (left) and buyer (right).
Proﬁt (or utility) representation
Each market period is separated into three phases. During the preview phase, which lasts 60
seconds, and during the 180 second trading phase, a seller is able to enter “Price” and “Quantity”
into a “Proﬁt Calculator,” which appears on the lower right hand side of the seller screen in ﬁgure 1.
(The ﬁnal phase is the 30 second review phase, when sellers and buyers have an opportunity to
examine the results of the trading phase.) This Proﬁt Calculator displays both a tabular and a
graphical representation of the utility level that would result from a proposed trade. Examples of
the Proﬁt Calculator are shown for a seller and for a buyer in ﬁgure 2, starting from the seller’s
and the buyer’s initial endowments. When a subject enters data into the Price and Quantity boxes
in this calculator and clicks “Update Table,” the proﬁt (or utility) level is displayed in the center
of the table for the allocation that would result from the proposed exchange. Proﬁt levels are
also displayed in the table for prices above and below the proposed price, and for quantities above
and below the proposed quantity. In addition, the graph represents the “Current Allocation,”PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 8
the “Proposed Allocation” which would result from the proposed Price and Quantity, and the
“Iso-proﬁt Curve” (or indiﬀerence curve) that passes through the Proposed Allocation.
Instructions
The CDA mechanism and the representation of proﬁt (or utility) levels are explained to subjects
in a detailed interactive instruction set. Instructions describe each element of the seller’s (or buyer’s)
trading screen independently, and then describe how elements relate to one another. There are
points in the instruction set at which the seller or buyer is prompted for inputs, and there are eight
interactive questions that must be answered correctly in order to proceed through the instructions.
The sequence of steps through the instructions is outlined in Appendix A.
Experiment sessions and experience
Experiment sessions York1, York2, and York3 were conducted at the University of York in
the U.K. on June 7, 2001. These three sessions had a total of thirty-six student subjects drawn
from a wide range of backgrounds, including the physical and social sciences, the arts, and the
humanities. Session Ariz1 was conducted at the University of Arizona on Nov. 16, 2001 with
twelve undergraduate students recruited from across all majors.5 Subjects in all exchange economy
sessions had prior CDA experience in a session with a list of unit costs for each seller and a list
of unit values for each buyer, rather than a utility function. Experience in a CDA with induced
costs and values simpliﬁed subjects’ learning tasks, since they were already familiar with the CDA
market institution when they participated in the induced utility experiment. From the pool of 120
subjects at York who had experience in an induced cost and value CDA in the two weeks prior to
sessions York1, York2, and York3, for the induced utility sessions we did not attempt to recruit the
20 subjects whose earnings were lowest as a fraction of equilibrium earnings in the induced cost
and value sessions. A similar criterion was applied for session Ariz1.
5 In a ﬁfth session, prices continued to decline between periods 10 and 15, after they had already fallen to the
competitive equilibrium price. During these six periods, 22 units were sold by the sellers at a loss. Misunderstanding
of the utility inducement technique, particularly by three sellers, led to their poor performance and to a large deviation
from equilibrium. Since the supply exhibited by these sellers substantially exceeded the induced supply, analysis of
the market requires a decision error variable in the regressions. This analysis though complicates the basic adjustment
model, provides no additional insight into price dynamics, and doesn’t alter the basic conclusions of the paper, so
the ﬁfth session is not evaluated in this paper.
It is not the failure to converge though that limits the usefulness of the data from the ﬁfth session. An adjustment
process could fail to converge, even though no subject trades at a loss. If price adjustment includes both lagged price
changes (with positive coeﬃcients) and the usual adjustment term from excess demand, then the price path may
repeatedly overshoot the equilibrium and fail to converge. This would be an interesting outcome well worth analysis.
The failure to converge in the ﬁfth session though did not result from an unanticipated adjustment dynamic like this,
but rather from an apparent misunderstanding of the utility inducement technique by three sellers.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 9
4 Convergence
This section assesses convergence of prices and allocations in four experiment sessions. Section 4.1
assesses convergence of individual allocations to the competitive equilibrium allocation. Section 4.2
applies the tatonnement price adjustment rule to evaluate across-period convergence of mean prices.
Section 4.3, which compares the extent of across-period price convergence to the extent of within-
period price convergence, demonstrates that most price adjustment occurs within trading periods.
This motivates the analysis of within-period adjustment in Sections 5 and 6.
4.1 Convergence of allocations across periods
Prices converge reliably in the exchange economy experiment sessions (with the exception of the
session in which several subjects apparently misunderstood the utility inducement technique). Fig-
ure 3 (a) shows the per capita interim allocations after each trade during three trading periods from
session York1. Figure 3 (b) depicts ﬁnal per capita allocations from each period in York1. Figure 4
shows, in detailed views, ﬁnal allocations by period for each session. Note that the diagrams in
ﬁgure 4 show only 2.6% of the area of the Edgeworth diagrams in ﬁgure 3, and the diagram for
session York2 shows less than 0.25% of the area. These diagrams suggest a signiﬁcant level of
convergence across periods in three of four sessions, and almost immediate convergence in the ﬁrst
period of the session shown in ﬁgure 4 (b).
(a) Trades within periods (b) Final allocations across periods
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Figure 3: Interim allocations in three periods (left) and ﬁnal allocation for all periods (right) of York1PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 10
(a) York1 (b) York2
(c) York3 (d) Ariz1


































































Figure 4: Edgeworth diagram details for experiment sessions.
With twelve agents and two commodities, the allocation space has twenty-four dimensions,
so these diagrams substantially – though usefully – compress the data. Statistical evaluation
of convergence of individual allocations to the competitive equilibrium allocations conﬁrms the
impression of convergence conveyed by these diagrams. Convergence is evaluated by measuring the
distance between each trader’s allocation and their competitive equilibrium allocation, and showing
that these distances, averaged across traders, converge across periods.
Let (xt,i, yt,i) be the period t ﬁnal allocation for agent i and let (x∗
i, y∗
i ) be the equilibriumPRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 11
allocation for agent i. The metric used to measure the distance between the ﬁnal allocation
(xt, yt) = ((xt,1, yt,1),(xt,2, yt,2),...,(xt,12, yt,12)) observed in period t and the equilibrium allo-
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The rationale for this distance metric is straightforward: if trades take place at the equilibrium price
p∗ = 91 and the ﬁnal allocation of each trader falls short of or exceeds the equilibrium allocation
by α units, then the distance between the allocation and the equilibrium allocation is α.
With the distance d((xt,yt), (x∗, y∗)) denoted dt, convergence is evaluated with the regres-
sion equation dt = d1 e−r lnt ηt (where {ηt} is a sequence of independent, identically distributed
lognormal random variables). This can be expressed as the linear model lndt = lnd1 − r lnt + ǫt.
(a) York1 (b) York2
(c) York3 (d) Ariz1
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Figure 5: Convergence of allocations in four sessions.
Figure 5 shows the sequence of observed distances {dt}
T
t=1 and also shows estimates from the
regression.6 Table 2 summarizes convergence estimates for each of the four sessions. Strong con-
6 Although the linear model dt = d1 − r t + ǫt can be ﬁt to this data, the exponential model is more appropriate,
since distances cannot be negative. In addition, the average R
2 statistic for the exponential model is slightly higher
than it is for a linear model.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 12
vergence occurs in all four sessions (as measured by the estimates ˆ r and their p-values).7 The R2





Periods ˆ d1 ˆ r (ˆ r > 0) R2 ˆ dT ˆ dT/ˆ d1
York1 12 2.464 0.754 0.000 0.886 0.378 0.153
York2 12 1.235 0.566 0.000 0.826 0.302 0.245
York3 12 3.006 0.605 0.001 0.675 0.669 0.223
Ariz1 15 3.483 0.559 0.000 0.699 0.740 0.212
Table 2: This table includes estimates ˆ d1 of the initial distance from equilibrium, estimates of
the rate of convergence ˆ r, p-values for the hypothesis test that r > 0, R2 statistics for the model,
distances ˆ dT implied by the estimates ˆ r and ˆ d1 in the last period (where ˆ dT = ˆ d1 e−ˆ r lnT), and the
ratio of the implied estimate for the last period to the estimate for the ﬁrst period.
4.2 Price convergence across periods: tatonnement
Across-period adjustment of average price is evaluated with the price adjustment rule from the
tatonnement model ¯ p t+1 = ¯ p t + bZ(¯ p t) + ǫ t+1, where Z(¯ p t) is market excess demand at ¯ p t. If
¯ p t = p∗ then excess demand is zero, so the expected price in period t + 1 is the equilibrium price,
but for an adjustment rate b > 0 that is not too large (overshooting is possible in the discrete
version of the tatonnement model), and for ¯ p t  = p∗, the expected mean price in period t + 1 lies
between ¯ p t and p∗.
If there is no systematic adjustment in response to excess demand (b = 0), this adjustment
process is the random walk ¯ p t+1 = ¯ p t + ǫ t+1, and if b < 0 the process is non-stationary, so
construction of hypothesis tests requires some caution. First, in order to formulate a test of the
hypothesis b > 0 against the null hypothesis of a random walk (if b = 0) or a non-stationary process
(if b < 0), the model needs to be formulated in ﬁrst diﬀerences ∆¯ p t+1 = ¯ p t+1 − ¯ p t, as
∆¯ p t+1 = bZ(¯ p t) + ǫ t+1. (4.1)
4.2.1 Formal adjustment test with linear approximation to excess demand
The model in equation (4.1) is similar to the “mean-reversion” model (or what in this context could
naturally be called an “equilibrium reversion” model) ∆¯ p t+1 = β (p∗ − ¯ p t)+ǫ t+1. The equilibrium
7 Nine input errors were corrected from the four sessions for the estimates reported here and in Section 6. In the
four sessions there were 2291 trades, so the errors represent less than one in 254 trades. Three of the nine errors
occurred when a seller omitted a digit in his ask or a buyer included an extra digit in her bid.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 13
p∗ is known to the experimenter and β (p∗− ¯ p t) is a linear approximation to bZ(¯ p t) around p∗. Let
¯ d t = ¯ p t−p∗. (In Section 4.1 d t is the distance between an allocation and the equilibrium allocation.
Here ¯ d t is the diﬀerence between the average price and the equilibrium price in period t.) Then
the adjustment process can be expressed as
∆¯ d t+1 = −β ¯ d t + ǫ t+1. (4.2)
The Dickey-Fuller unit root test can be applied to the model in equation (4.2) to test the null
hypothesis of a random walk (β = 0) or non-stationarity (β < 0) against the alternative hypothesis
that price responds in the predicted direction to deviations from equilibrium. The standard Dickey-
Fuller test procedure involves inclusion of a constant term β0, and the augmented procedure tests
lagged dependent variables. The augmented model is tested, and insigniﬁcant lags are eliminated.
For the mean price sequences from the four experiment sessions, no lagged price change is signiﬁcant,
so the model ∆d t+1 = β0 − β ¯ d t + ǫ t+1 is estimated. The t-statistics for ˆ β0 fall within the range
(−2.179,2.179) for sessions York1, York2, and York3, so the hypothesis of a constant term in
the adjustment process is rejected for these three sessions using a standard t-test.8 The null
hypothesis of no adjustment due to price deviation from equilibrium is then tested in the model
of equation (4.2), which doesn’t include a constant term. For that model, the critical value of the
t-statistic is the Dickey-Fuller test statistic τ = −1.95 for a test at the 95% conﬁdence level. The
second row for each session in table 3 shows estimates for this model and the t-statistic for the test
of the null hypothesis that β = 0. For sessions York1, York2, and York3, the null hypothesis is
rejected: adjustment in each case is signiﬁcant and in the direction of equilibrium.9 Results from
session Ariz1 are somewhat mixed. The constant term is signiﬁcant, and in the model with the
constant term included, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that prices follow a random
walk or a non-stationary process, since the adjustment term has the wrong sign. If attention is
restricted to the last eight periods in Ariz1, when adjustment took place, the result diﬀers. In
periods 8 – 15, the constant term remains signiﬁcant, but in the model without a constant term,
adjustment is signiﬁcant in the model. Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock [1996] demonstrate that
Dickey-Fuller tests have very low power when the product of the sample size and the adjustment
8 The average price in the ﬁrst period of York2 was ¯ p1 = 93.44, which is very near the competitive equilibrium
price p
∗ = 91. The average price moved away from the competitive equilibrium price in period 2 to ¯ p2 = 95.23, moved
further away in period 3 to ¯ p3 = 95.85, and then began to slowly adjust back to the equilibrium price. Although the
average price movements in these two periods were small, they moved in the opposite direction from the predicted
adjustment in response to excess demand. It is remarkable that price adjusted between periods 4 and 12 toward the
competitive equilibrium: excess demand at the mean price in period 3 was Z
Y
(95.85) = −0.799, or −0.133 on a per
capita basis. With periods 1 and 2 included, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of a random walk.
9 The general Dickey-Fuller test procedure is described in Enders [1995]. See in particular equations (4.9), (4.10),
ﬁgure 4.7. Enders provides critical values for the Dickey-Fuller test statistics in his Table A.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 14
parameter is small.10 In this situation, the null hypothesis is frequently accepted when it is in fact
false. Given this situation, it is noteworthy that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the ﬁrst
three sessions, and for the last eight periods of the session Ariz1.
Periods β0 −β t-stat Test
York1 1 – 12 −0.038 −0.175 −0.086 β0 = 0
−0.172 −11.101 β = 0
York2 3 – 12 0.232 −0.096 0.366 β0 = 0
−0.041 −2.432 β = 0
York3 1 – 12 3.041 0.009 1.814 β0 = 0
−0.123 −4.334 β = 0
Ariz1 1 – 15 5.973 0.166 5.306 β0 = 0
−0.066 −2.046 β = 0
Ariz1 8 – 15 4.873 0.047 0.205 β0 = 0
−0.198 −3.246 β = 0
Table 3: Regression coeﬃcients and statistics for the linear adjustment rule.
4.2.2 Informal adjustment test with excess demand
Equation (4.2) conforms exactly to the model speciﬁcation in the Dickey-Fuller tests for a unit root,
whereas equation (4.1) conforms to the microeconomic model of price adjustment. Equation (4.1)
though can be put into a form similar to equation (4.2). First, use the change of variable ¯ d t = ¯ p t−p∗
to write equation (4.1) as
∆¯ d t+1 = bZ(¯ d t + p∗) + ǫ t+1. (4.3)
In equation (4.2) the regressor ¯ d t passes through the origin with slope one. In equation (4.3)
the regressor Z(¯ d t + p∗) passes through the origin but its slope there is −0.1713. The function
˜ Z(¯ d t) = −Z(¯ d t + p∗)/0.1713 passes through the origin with slope one, so
∆¯ d t+1 = −b′ ˜ Z(¯ d t) + ǫ t+1 (4.4)
is equivalent to equation (4.1) and it is tangent to equation (4.2) at ¯ d t = 0 (if b′ = β).
The Dickey-Fuller test statistic is not formally applicable to equation (4.4), but the regressor
˜ Z(¯ d t) approximates the regressor ¯ d t in equation (4.1) from the formal statistical model, so the test
can be carried out with equation (4.4), albeit informally.
10 A central argument in this paper is that within-period adjustment exceeds across-period adjustment. The power
of Dickey-Fuller tests is much higher in tests of the Hahn process than in tests of tatonnement adjustment, since the
sample size for the Hahn process approximately equals the number of trades rather than the number of periods. This
provides an econometric rationale that complements other arguments in the paper for within-period analysis.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 15
Periods b0 −b′ t-stat Test
York1 1 - 12 0.352 −0.124 1.009 b0 = 0
−0.143 −11.175 b′ = 0
York2 3 - 12 0.206 −0.093 0.336 b0 = 0
−0.043 −2.431 b′ = 0
York3 1 - 12 2.677 0.007 2.088 b0 = 0
−0.089 −4.064 b′ = 0
Ariz1 1 - 15 5.463 0.105 6.018 b0 = 0
−0.041 −1.702 b′ = 0
Ariz1 8 - 15 4.780 0.035 7.081 b0 = 0
−0.141 −2.548 b′ = 0
Table 4: Regression coeﬃcients and statistics for the non-linear adjustment rule.
Table 4 reports estimates and t-statistics for the model in equation (4.4) in which price adjusts in
response to excess demand, rather than in response to deviations from equilibrium. All conclusions
remain the same with the alternative formulation. In this formulation too, the lack of adjustment
in the ﬁrst seven periods of Ariz1 seems to be the reason that the null hypothesis β ≤ 0 cannot be
rejected. (This lack of adjustment is most apparent in ﬁgure 8.) When the test is performed on
periods 8 – 15, the adjustment term is, at b′ = 0.141, as strong as in any session, and its t-statistic
of −2.548 is well below the Dickey-Fuller test statistic τ = −1.95. Since lagged price changes are
rejected in the data, the lack of adjustment between periods 2 and 7 does not result from serial
correlation.11 It must be the result of a structural change. In fact, evidence of that structural
change is apparent in the data: beginning near the end of period 6, one buyer recognized that she
could increase her utility by raising her bid above the prevailing price. Figure 1 shows data from
the end of period 6, including the market queue. All prices in the period were at 60, 61, or 62 until
Buyer 2 paid 65 near the end of the period and then paid 70 in the ﬁnal trade of the period. Near
the end of the period, she raised her ﬁnal bid to 79. At the end of period 7 three other buyers
imitated her behavior. Starting in period 8, the structural change was fully in eﬀect. (See ﬁgure 8.)
It is interesting and notable that the econometric technique rejects serial correlation in errors as
the explanation and points instead (via comparison between the test statistics for the full sample
and the subsample of periods) to a structural change, which examination of individual behavior
supports.
11 In these models, the presence of lagged price changes in the adjustment process and the presence of serial
correlation in the error structure are indistinguishable. Appendix B demonstrates that a model with ﬁrst-order serial
correlation is equivalent to a model with a single lagged price change in the adjustment function. In general, a model
with AR(n) errors is equivalent to a model with n lagged price adjustment terms. (See Davidson and McKinnon
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4.3 Comparison of across-period and within-period price adjustment
Section 4.1 demonstrates that allocations converge to the competitive equilibrium allocation across
trading periods. Section 4.2 demonstrates that average prices converge to the competitive equilib-
rium price with tatonnement price adjustment. This section compares the extent of across-period
price adjustment to the extent of within-period price adjustment and demonstrates that across-
period price changes are typically smaller than within-period price changes, which motivates the
analysis of within-period price adjustment in Sections 5 and 6.
For periods t = 2, 3, ..., T, the ratio A
a
t = 1−| ¯ pt −p∗|/| ¯ pt−1 −p∗| measures price adjustment
across periods. Denote the number of trades in period t by Kt. Within-period price adjustment for



















Three cases help interpret these measures of across-period and within-period price adjustment.
The ﬁrst case involves only within-period adjustment, the second considers equal within-period and
across-period adjustment, and the ﬁnal one involves only across-period adjustment.
(1) If price adjusts within each period so that
P Kt
k=Kt−4 (pt,k − p∗) = (1 − α)
P 5
k=1 (pt,k − p∗), and
if there is no adjustment across periods, then A
a
t = 0 and A
w
t = α.
(2) If price adjusts geometrically within each period so that (pt,Kt − p∗) = (1 − α)(pt,1 − p∗), and
if the ﬁrst price in period t + 1 is equal to the last price in period t, then A
a




(3) If price in each period is constant and (pt,k − p∗) = (1 − α)(pt−1,k − p∗), then A
a




Average across-period price adjustment A
a
t for the four sessions was ¯ A
a
= 0.078 and average
within-period adjustment A
w
t was ¯ A
w
= 0.238.12 Although the tatonnement model tracks across-
period price changes, these average price changes are most likely a response to large within-period
price changes. The next section explores the predictions of the Hahn process model of within-period
price adjustment in order to better understand price adjustment.
5 Hahn process dynamics
In the four experiment sessions, prices and allocations converge across periods to the competitive
equilibrium. Since the magnitude of within-period price changes exceeds that of across-period price
12 In the ﬁrst two periods of York2, the mean price moved away from the equilibrium price. In the ﬁfteenth period
of Ariz1, the mean price overshot the equilibrium price slightly, going from ¯ p14 = 90.1 to ¯ p15 = 93.6. Both these
movements decrease the measures of within-period and the across-period price changes. Without these three periods,
the measures are ¯ A
a
= 0.146 for across-period price adjustment and ¯ A
w
= 0.347 for within-period price adjustment.
With or without these three outliers, these measures indicate that there is substantially more price adjustment within
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changes, within-period price dynamics are evaluated with the Hahn process model of disequilibrium
price adjustment.
This section begins, in Section 5.1, with a brief description of the continuous version of the Hahn
process formulated in Hahn and Negishi [1962]. Section 5.2 adapts the model to the context of
the market experiment with trade in discrete units and discrete price adjustment. The experiment
includes several replications of the exchange economy, so Section 5.3 augments the Hahn process
model with a simple rule for across-period price adjustment.
5.1 Hahn process description and notation
In an exchange economy with m commodities and n agents, each with a utility function ui(x,y)
and an endowment ωi, prices in the Hahn process adjust in response to excess demand. Unlike
tatonnement though, in the Hahn process, trade takes place as soon as a price is announced. In the
continuous version of the Hahn process, the initial price vector is held constant during some time
interval [0, h], and subsequently (for t > h) prices adjusts continually in response to excess demand
according to the rule ˙ p(t) = cZ
Y
(p(t)|x(t)), where x(t) is the allocation that results from all trades
that have occurred along the price path (p(s))s∈(0, t). Trades of the goods follow some rule ˙ xi(t)
that satisﬁes three conditions: (1) the budget of each agent i balances (p(t)  ˙ xi(t) = 0); (2) the net
ﬂow of each commodity balances (
P n
i=1 ˙ xi(t) = 0); and (3) the executed trade increases the utility of
at least one agent and does not decrease the utility of any agent (ui(xi(t)+ ˙ xi(t)) ≥ ui(xi(t)) for all
i with strict inequality for at least one agent). Hahn and Negishi [1962] and Arrow and Hahn [1971,
Chapter 13] demonstrate that this price adjustment process converges to a Pareto optimal allocation
for any adjustment rate c and any trade process that satisﬁes the three indicated conditions.13
5.2 Discrete Hahn process price adjustment
A discrete version of this process adapts the model to the experiment. The discrete version with
two commodities operates simply. At the announced price pt,k some buyer with excess demand at
that price transfers pt,k units of the numeraire commodity to a seller, who in return transfers one
13 Their main claim though is that as adjustments approach their continuous limit, prices and allocations converge
to a competitive equilibrium of the original economy. In the Scarf example, if price adjusts slowly and the trade
quantity at each announced price is relatively large, the limit of both the price and the allocation diﬀer from the
competitive equilibrium allocation. On the other hand, if price adjustment is rapid and trade quantities are small,
the process can converge, even in a single trading period, to the competitive equilibrium of the Scarf example.
Nevertheless, even if the theorem were stated and proven correctly, the result would only be applicable to economies
much larger than the one in the experiment, due to the assumption in the Hahn process model that trades are very
small relative to equilibrium net trades. In the experiment, convergence is to a Pareto optimal allocation within
periods; convergence to the competitive equilibrium price and allocation takes place across periods.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 18
unit of the other commodity to the buyer. With this adjustment process, rules (1) and (2) are
met by construction; rule (3) is imposed in simulations by ending trade when there is no Pareto
improving trade at the announced price.14
The excess demand of each agent depends on his current allocation and on the market price, so
implementation of the model requires an expression for the allocation of each trader in terms of his
initial endowment and the interim allocation that results after each trade. Suppose that from the
sequence Pt,k = (pt,1, pt,2, pt,3, ..., pt,k) of the ﬁrst k trades in period t, agent i has taken part in
ki trades. These ki trades by agent i can be denoted P
(i)
t,k = (pt,i1, pt,i2, ..., pt,iki
). The allocation
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In the discrete version of the Hahn process, price adjusts after each trade in response to aggregate
excess demand. After trade k in period t, price adjusts so that

















The estimation procedure in Section 6.2 uses the expression for excess demand from the right side
of equation (5.1) as a regressor. Simulation uses estimates from the augmented version of this
model, which includes statistically signiﬁcant lagged price changes.
5.3 Initial prices in periods t = 2, 3, ..., T
This section examines the distribution of initial prices in period t+1 in terms of the range of prices
in period t. The Hahn process estimation procedure does not capture this aspect of the adjustment
process, so it is examined separately and combined with estimates of within-period adjustment in
a twelve-period simulation in Section 6.3.
The within-period price path predicted by the Hahn process has two free parameters: the
initial price pt,1 and the adjustment rate c. The model is adapted in this paper to account for the
replications of the economy across trading periods by including a simple rule for setting the initial
price in periods t = 2,3,...,T. The initial price in period t is assumed to be a weighted average of
the maximum price and the minimum price from period t − 1:
pt,1 ≡ (1 − a) min{pt−1,1, pt−1,2, ..., pt−1,Kt−1} + a max{pt−1,1, pt−1,2, ..., pt−1,Kt−1}. (5.2)
Forty-seven observations of a are obtained from the ﬁfty-one periods in four experiment sessions.
In the four sessions, the median value of a was a24 = 0.477. The mean was ˆ a = 0.476, its sample
14 This rule may not reach a Pareto optimal allocation because it can stop at the net demand of one agent. Other
ending rules that are consistent with condition (3) are also possible. A rule that repeatedly changes the price if no
Pareto improving trade is possible at the current price will eventually reach a Pareto optimal allocation.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 19
variance was s2 = 0.083, and its minimum and maximum values were zero and one. These statistics
are almost indistinguishable from a uniform distribution on [0,1].














Figure 6: Distribution of initial prices pt,1 in the four sessions (left) and simulation (right).
The distribution of a is shown on the left side in ﬁgure 6. The data on the right side of
the ﬁgure are simulated values of a for the forty-seven individual period price ranges from the
experiment sessions. The data were generated by taking each of these forty-seven price ranges,
selecting an (integer-valued) initial price for the next period uniformly from that interval, and then
calculating the statistic a for that initial price. This was replicated twenty times to get a simulation
of the distribution of initial prices. Based on the distribution of a from the experiment and the
simulated distribution, it seems reasonable to augment the Hahn process price adjustment model
for replicated market environments with the initial price in period t + 1 selected randomly from a
uniform distribution on the interval between the minimum and the maximum price in period t.15
6 Hahn process estimation and simulation
With error terms added to predicted price adjustments, prices in period t evolve according to the
equation pt,k+1 = pt,k +cZ
Y
(pt,k)+ǫt,k+1. As with the tatonnement model, if c = 0 the adjustment
process follows a random walk and if c < 0, the process is non-stationary. Consequently, the test
for c > 0 must be conducted in ﬁrst diﬀerences ∆pt,k+1 = pt,k+1 − pt,k as
∆pt,k+1 = cZ
Y
(pt,k) + ǫt,k+1. (6.1)
15 Easley and Ledyard [1993] construct their model of double auction bidding behavior from their observation –
based on their examination of data from double auction trading experiments – that in market environments with
induced costs and values prices in period t+1 typically fall within the observed price range from period t. My claim
is similar, but has two diﬀerences. I make the weaker claim that only the initial price in period t + 1 falls in the
range of period t prices, and I make the more speciﬁc assumption that it is drawn uniformly from that interval. The
two approaches are similar: both are based on observations from double auction experiments. The diﬀerent economic
environment that I consider leads to my restriction of the assumption to initial prices, and I make the more speciﬁc
distributional assumption based on statistical properties of initial prices.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 20
6.1 Hahn process estimation with linear approximation to excess demand
As with the test of the tatonnement model, the model in equation (6.1) does not ﬁt exactly into
the framework of the unit-root tests. With the linear approximation γ (p∗ − pt,k) to cZ
Y
(pt,k) in
equation (6.1), the adjustment equation can be written ∆pt,k+1 = γ (p∗ − pt,k) + ǫt,k+1. Since it is
deviations from equilibrium that lead to price adjustment, dt,k = pt,k − p∗ can be substituted into
this equation to get the equivalent adjustment model ∆dt,k+1 = −γ dt,k +ǫt,k+1. This is the version
of the Dickey-Fuller test without a constant or a trend term. In the general test procedure, we can
add a constant term and lagged price changes. The adjustment model doesn’t include a constant
term, so we expect that the constant term will be rejected. The model also does not include lagged
price changes, though that seems plausible.16 With a constant term and lagged price adjustment,
the model is
∆dt,k+1 = γ0 − γ dt,k +
q X
j=1
βj ∆dt,k+1−j + ǫt,k+1. (6.2)
In this form, the hypothesis test γ > 0 is carried out by comparing the t-statistic from the parameter
estimate to the critical value of the Dickey-Fuller test statistic for a unit-root process.17
The number of lags can be examined either by a general-to-speciﬁc sequential rule or the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The general-to-speciﬁc sequential rule begins with a large
number of lags (set at q = 8 here), and then insigniﬁcant lags are eliminated with a standard t-test.
For the model with a constant and approximately 500 sample points, if the absolute value of the
t-statistic is greater than 1.96 the hypothesis that a lagged price adjustment parameter βj equals
zero can be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level, using a standard t-test.
This test was used to eliminate insigniﬁcant lags. 18 (Only signiﬁcant lags are reported in
tables 5 and 6.) Once insigniﬁcant lags are eliminated, the hypothesis that the constant term
is zero is tested with a standard t-test. Since the constant term is signiﬁcant in York2, the test
statistic τµ = −2.87 is used to reject the hypothesis of no adjustment.19
16 As outlined in footnote 10 and detailed Appendix B, lagged price changes in the adjustment process and serial
correlation in the error structure are indistinguishable.
17 The procedure for these tests is similar to the tests with the tatonnement model in Section 4.2, but lags are
signiﬁcant in the within-period adjustment process. For these tests, see equations (4.12) and (4.13) and ﬁgure 4.7 in
Enders [1995].
18 In general, the BIC is consistent while the general-to-speciﬁc rule has positive probability of over-ﬁtting. Even
so, the results for the four exchange economy sessions are identical with the two procedures.
19 In York2 excess demand was small, and adjustment was in the right direction, but the impetus to adjustment
was so subtle that it is unsurprising that the constant term is signiﬁcant (i.e., prices converged statistically to a price
slightly diﬀerent from the equilibrium price). If the ﬁrst period is not included, and the equilibrium price is taken as
pe = 94 rather than p
∗ = 91, then the constant term is not signiﬁcant while the adjustment term remains signiﬁcant.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 21
In the three sessions for which the constant term is rejected, the model is estimated without a
constant to test for signiﬁcance of the adjustment term. In each of these sessions, the adjustment
term is signiﬁcant with a p-value below 5% (Dickey-Fuller test statistic τ = −1.95). In fact, in
sessions York1 and York3, it is signiﬁcant with a p-value below 1% (Dickey-Fuller test statistic
τ = −2.58). These results are all summarized in Table 5, which shows parameter estimates for
the model in equation (6.2). In session York2, which has a signiﬁcant constant term, the null
hypothesis of a unit root (no adjustment) is rejected. (The critical value of the Dickey-Fuller test
with a constant term is τµ = −3.44) at a p-value of 1%.)
N γ0 −γ β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 t-stat Test
York1 511 0.171 −0.034 −0.692 −0.601 −0.463 −0.300 −0.287 0.83 γ0 = 0
— −0.045 −0.680 −0.590 −0.453 −0.293 −0.283 −5.45 γ = 0
York2 483 0.721 −0.198 −0.244 5.56 γ0 = 0
— 0.721 −0.198 −0.244 −6.41 γ = 0
York3 527 0.420 0.005 −0.721 −0.443 −0.437 −0.219 1.78 γ0 = 0
— −0.013 −0.699 −0.422 −0.419 −0.206 −2.90 γ = 0
Ariz1 718 −0.293 −0.022 −0.693 −1.13 γ0 = 0
— −0.011 −0.699 −2.13 γ = 0
Table 5: Parameter estimates and t-statistics for the linear adjustment rule in equation (6.2).
6.2 Hahn process estimation with excess demand
Equation (6.2) has the merit that it is speciﬁed so that the Dickey-Fuller tests apply to it. The
model too is very similar to the Hahn process adjustment model, since Z
Y
(pt,k) is nearly linear in
a fairly large region around the equilibrium price p∗. As a consequence of this, the results from the
model in equation (6.2) should be similar to the results from the model





bj ∆pt,k+1−j + ǫt,k+1. (6.3)
Comparison is facilitated if, as with the unit root test for the tatonnement adjustment model, we













bj ∆dt,k+1−j + ǫt,k+1 (6.4)
has the same slope at dt,k = 0 as the regressor in equation (6.2), so that estimates from the two
are comparable. In fact, all of the results for this model are identical to those for the model in
equation (6.2). All of the results in table 6 are interpreted similarly to those in table 5.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 22
N a0 −c′ b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 t-stat Test
York1 511 0.199 −0.028 −0.678 −0.589 −0.455 −0.295 −0.284 1.12 a0 = 0
— −0.037 −0.660 −0.571 −0.439 −0.282 −0.278 −5.54 c′ = 0
York2 483 0.535 −0.165 −0.245 4.90 a0 = 0
— 0.535 −0.165 −0.245 −5.95 c′ = 0
York3 527 0.233 0.003 −0.707 −0.431 −0.428 −0.212 1.19 a0 = 0
— −0.010 −0.686 −0.412 −0.412 −0.202 −3.21 c′ = 0
Ariz1 719 −0.186 −0.012 −0.687 −0.80 a0 = 0
— −0.007 −0.694 −2.09 c′ = 0
Table 6: Parameter estimates and t-statistics for model in equation (6.4)
6.3 Construction of predicted price sequences
The sequence of predicted price changes ∆pt,k+1 for k = 1,2,3,...,Kt from equation (6.4) with
parameter estimates substituted into the equation can be used to generate the predicted price path
from each session. The predicted price sequence is pt,1, pt,2 +∆pt,2, pt,3 +∆pt,3, ..., pt,Kt +∆pt,Kt.
Figures 7 and 8 show the trade prices and the estimated adjustment function in each session. In
each graph, successive periods are separated by a vertical line, trade prices are shown as dots,
and the number of trades is indicated for each period. The equilibrium price is shown as a solid
horizontal line at p∗ = 91. The estimated adjustment path is shown as a solid path in each graph
(though the estimated path is often diﬃcult to distinguish from the observed price path). Prices
demonstrate a remarkably tendency toward the equilibrium, even in York2, which was so close to
the equilibrium in the third period that the excess demand on a per capita basis was less than
−0.133 units.
6.4 Hahn process simulation
Hahn process simulation with discrete trades in two commodities and replication of trading periods
is fully speciﬁed by (1) an initial price p1,1 in period 1; (2) the price adjustment rule in equation (6.3);
and (3) the initial price in periods t = 2,3,...,T in equation (5.2). The price path through T
periods is only a function of the initial price p1,1 in period 1, the adjustment rate c, the coeﬃcients
βj on lagged price changes, and the random terms ǫt,k and across-period adjustment terms a.
For a ﬁxed value of c, a predicted price path for period t is determined starting from the initial
price pt,1. The predicted second price pt,2 is determined based on pt,1 and the adjustment rule in
equation (6.3). Subsequent predicted prices are determined iteratively.
The Hahn process model and its adaptation to the replicated economies of experiments can
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Figure 9: Simulation of price path within and across periods.
across trading periods from a simulation of this model. In this simulation, within-period prices are
determined by equation (6.3), with parameter estimates from session York1. The initial price in
period t + 1 is selected randomly from the interval of period t prices, and the standard deviation
of the errors decreased geometrically across periods according to the equation σt = 2   0.9t−1.
Comparison of this ﬁgure with ﬁgure 7 (a) suggests that the Hahn process price adjustment modelPRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 25
captures many key features of the price path.
7 Conclusions
The pure exchange economy is the fundamental model in the neoclassical theory of value. Em-
pirical assessment of the Generalized Axioms of Revealed Preference (GARP), as in Cox [1997],
demonstrates that choices over a small number of commodities are consistent with the existence of a
regular preference ordering or utility function. The experiments reported in this paper demonstrate
that when agents with (induced) regular utility functions trade in an exchange economy, prices and
allocations converge across trading periods to its competitive equilibrium. Consequently, the two
key assumptions in the neoclassical theory of value – agents have consistent preference orderings
and exchange by agents with consistent preference orderings (or utility) leads to a competitive equi-
librium allocation – are supported by experimental evidence, at least when these two assumptions
are evaluated separately.
Equilibrium predictions though are not the whole story. Price dynamics in an exchange economy
have a complex structure. Exchange economy experiments exhibit both across-period and within-
period convergence. Comparison of price adjustment across periods and price adjustment within
periods demonstrates that most price adjustment occurs within each trading period. Consequently,
disequilibrium models that predict price adjustment within trading periods are essential in order
to understand the dynamics of convergence in general equilibrium models. Previous experiments
with induced values and costs did not reveal the full complexity of the convergence process.
The augmented Hahn process price adjustment model estimated in this paper is broadly consis-
tent with price adjustment in partial equilibrium environments that have been studied in numerous
CDA experiments beginning with Smith [1962]. Experimentally, a partial equilibrium market en-
vironment is created in the laboratory by inducing values for buyers and costs for sellers. Gjerstad
and Shachat [2007] demonstrate that any partial equilibrium environment can be generated from
an exchange environment with quasi-linear utility functions, so the price adjustment model esti-
mated in this paper should apply also to adjustment in CDA experiments with induced values and
costs, since these too can be viewed as exchange economy environments. In partial equilibrium
market experiments, during early periods prices typically come from one side of the equilibrium in
a wide arc that approaches the equilibrium price. In each successive period prices tend to follow
a ﬂatter arc, with the initial price closer to the equilibrium price than in the previous period, and
the ﬁnal price in each period approaches the equilibrium price. In these partial equilibrium market
environments, even when units trade at prices away from the competitive equilibrium price, the
equilibrium price of the economy that remains after a disequilibrium trade is typically the same as
or very close to the equilibrium price of the original economy. As a result, trade prices converge toPRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 26
the equilibrium price at the end of the ﬁrst period. In the second period, prices typically fall in the
range of period 1 prices (as in the Easley-Ledyard model). As this process proceeds across periods,
prices converge to the equilibrium price, in the strict sense that prices are near the equilibrium
price throughout the period, not just at the end of the period.20
The exchange economy experiment provides strong evidence for convergence to competitive
equilibrium, and also demonstrates the importance of within-period price adjustment. A third
issue also motivates the experiment. Experimental evidence on price adjustment in standard partial
equilibrium market settings led eventually to development of models of price adjustment based on
the incentives of the individual agents. Models of this sort include Wilson [1987], Friedman [1991],
Easley and Ledyard [1993], Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998], and Gjerstad [2007]. The objective of
this line of research has been to gain insight into the processes that lead markets to their equilibrium
prices and allocations by examining the interactions among sellers and buyers. Extension of this
line of research to the general equilibrium context requires a base of facts to be explained. The
experiment reported in this paper examines the most elemental general equilibrium model, and as
such is a natural starting point for models of price formation in general equilibrium markets.
(a) Near middle of trading period (b) Near end of trading period
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Figure 10: Cone of Pareto improving prices and individual demands
In general, individual incentives vary much more than the global conditions summarized in
excess demand. A simple example illustrates this point. If prices are constant, then excess demand
does not change as trades are conducted. In ﬁgure 10 (a), suppose that the current allocation
20 This issue is discussed in Gjerstad and Shachat [2007].PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 27
is at point A. Then the demand of agent B is DB and the demand of agent S is DS. Excess
demand for Y is the vertical component of the distance DB −DS. The cone of prices that support
Pareto improving trades is shown as the two line segments emanating from A. Figure 10 (b)
shows the situation if trades continue at the same price until the allocation reaches DS. At that
point, excess demand is the same as it was when the allocation was A, but individual incentives
are much altered. Agent S has no more incentive to trade at the current price, and the cone of
prices that support Pareto improving trades has narrowed considerably. Even when prices change
over the course of a trading period, the change to excess demand is minor relative to the change
in the cone of Pareto improving prices. So models based on excess demand neglect aspects of the
exchange environment that will most likely prove to be important as incentive based models of price
adjustment are developed. Models of this process, once developed, will almost certainly enhance
further our understanding of the important problem of price dynamics in exchange economies.
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Appendix A
Prior to the start of an experiment session, a seller goes through an instruction set that describes each of the
elements of the seller screen and their operations. These elements include: (1) the seller’s endowment and current
allocation of currency and commodity, (2) the seller’s proﬁt (or utility) function, (3) input that the seller provides
during the session, (4) processing of input (by the CDA mechanism) from the seller, as well as from other sellers and
from buyers, and (5) determination of the seller’s proﬁt, which is based on the seller’s allocation of currency and
commodity. Buyers’ instructions are analogous to sellers’ instructions. The most important principle adhered to in
our implementation of instructions is that inputs of asks by sellers (or bids by buyers) are initiated by the seller (or
by the buyer) in order to avoid creation of a reference point eﬀect that would inﬂuence asks or bids once the session
begins.
Each seller and each buyer views a total of 33 screens, and makes inputs on ﬁve of these screens. There are eight
interactive questions that each seller and each buyer must answer correctly in order to proceed. Although there are
33 screens, most of the screen space is devoted to the actual screen display that the subject views and uses during the
experiment session. During the instructions, a text box describes elements of the seller’s screen display. The total
length of the sellers’ instructions in these text boxes is 3250 words, which is equivalent to approximately six pages of
text. Subjects typically complete instructions in 15 to 35 minutes.
The sequence of steps through the screens is described below. The instruction summary below refers frequently
to elements of the seller’s screen, which is shown in ﬁgure 1 (p. 6). The instructions for a buyer are similar. Direct
experimenter interaction with subjects was kept to a minimum whenever possible, including sign-in, seating, and
payment.
Screen 1: The subject’s earnings are based on subject’s decisions and the decisions of other participants.
Screen 2: The subject is a seller throughout an experiment session that lasts for 12 trading periods (in the ﬁrst
three sessions) or 15 periods (in session Ariz1).
Screen 3: The subject should not communicate with or distract others. The subject’s data are anonymous.
Screen 4: Payment is made at an exchange rate of £0.01 per unit of experiment currency accumulated. (This rate
was $0.008 in session 4 at the University of Arizona.) Payment is made anonymously in cash at the conclusion of
the experiment session.
Screen 5: There is a set of interactive instructions that follow this screen. The seller will know that he either has
or has not completed instructions based on the status message at the top of his screen.
Screen 6: Each period of the session consists of a 60 second “Preview Phase”, a “Trading Phase” of 180 seconds
and a “Review Phase” of 30 seconds. A clock at the top of the screen ticks down to the end of each phase.
Screen 7: The seller begins each period with eighteen units of the commodity. The current balance of both currency
and commodity are shown throughout each trading period in the Current Allocation box on the seller’s screen.
Screen 8: The location and purpose of the “Proﬁt Calculator” is described to the seller.
Screen 9: The seller is prompted to enter a Quantity and a Price into the Proﬁt Calculator. The proﬁt that would
result if the seller sold the proposed quantity at the proposed price is shown in the Proﬁt Calculator table, and
the Current Allocation and Proposed Allocation are shown in the Proﬁt Calculator Graph. (See ﬁgure 2 on p. 7
for a view of the Proﬁt Calculator for a seller and for a buyer.)
Screen 10: The Proﬁt Calculator table is described to the seller. Rows correspond to diﬀerent prices and columns
correspond to diﬀerent numbers of units sold. The proﬁt level for the price and quantity that the seller entered
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Question 1: For the quantity ‘q’ and the price ‘p’ that the seller entered, he is asked to state what his proﬁt would
be if he were to sell ‘q + 1’ units at price ‘p’.
Screen 11: The Proﬁt Calculator Graph is described. The graph shows the seller’s Current Allocation, the seller’s
Proposed Allocation (which is the allocation that would result if the seller exchanges q units of the commodity
for pq units of the numeraire commodity), and the Iso-proﬁt Curve that passes through the Proposed Allocation.
Screen 12: The seller is reminded that he begins each period with eighteen units of the commodity, and is asked to
use the Proﬁt Calculator to determine what his total proﬁt would be if he were to sell all eighteen units of the
commodity at the price that he entered on Screen 9.
Question 2: The seller is asked to enter the proﬁt that he would obtain if he were to sell all 18 units from his
commodity endowment at the price that he entered on screen 9.
Screen 13: The Proﬁt Calculator includes left and right arrows that can be used to decrease or increase the quantity
proposal and up and down arrows that can be used to decrease or increase the price proposal. (See ﬁgures 1 and
2.) The seller is encouraged to test these features.
Screen 14: An ask is entered in the “Enter Ask” area of the seller screen. The subject enters an ask at this point.
Screen 15: The ask entered by the subject appears in the Unit Ask row of the Trade Summary display. Commodity
Holding remains unchanged, but Commodity Available is reduced by one unit. The ask also appears in the “Your
Asks” display area.
Screen 16: Asks by all sellers and bids by all buyers appear in the “Market Queue” display.
Screen 17: A new ask is generated randomly to simulate an action by another seller. The new ask is at a higher
amount than the subject’s ask, to illustrate the Ask Improvement rule. (The new ask is generated randomly from
one to ten above the seller’s own ask, though the subject is not informed of the process that generates the new
ask.) The subject is also informed that if he makes a new ask at this point, the new ask will replace his current
ask.
Question 3: The seller has a quiz question appear at this point. The seller, after seeing a description of the Ask
Improvement rule, is prompted to state what is the highest ask that can be submitted at this point.
Question 4: After the subject answers Question 1 correctly, he is asked to state the number of asks that will be in
the Market Queue if he submits a new ask.
Screen 18: The subject is asked to enter a new ask that improves on the ask submitted by the simulated seller.
Screen 19: The new ask replaces the seller’s previous ask. The “Messages” display is shown, and updates to the
Trade Summary display are described.
Screen 20: The subject is prompted to remove his ask by double clicking on the ask in the “Your Asks” display.
Screen 21: Changes to the seller screen that result from the removal of his ask are described, including updates to
the Commodity Available, Your Asks, Market Queue, Trade Summary, and Messages displays.
Screen 22: The seller is prompted to enter a new ask to replace the ask that he just removed.
Screen 23: Updates to the seller’s screen that result from the new ask are reviewed.
Screen 24: A trade occurs when a seller’s ask is at or below the current best bid, or a buyer’s bid meets or exceeds
the best ask. The seller is informed that on the next screen, a bid from a simulated buyer will be generated that
will meet the seller’s ask, so that the seller will trade with the simulated buyer.
Screen 25: Updates to the seller’s Unit Price, Unit Proﬁt, and Total Proﬁt entries in his Trade Summary table that
result from the most recent trade are described. Changes to the Currency Holdings and Commodity Holdings
areas are described. The Market Transaction Prices graph update is described.PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 31
Screen 26: The price determination rule is reviewed and the seller is informed that after two questions, a bid will
be simulated that results in a trade with the current low ask.
Question 5: The seller is asked whether a trade will result if a buyer now submits a bid that is below the current
low ask.
Question 6: The subject is asked what the trade price will be if a bid is submitted that meets or exceeds the current
low ask.
Screen 27: A bid is simulated that generates another trade. (This trade is between a simulated seller and a simulated
buyer, so the subject only sees public information regarding the trade, i.e., its price on the Market Transaction
Prices graph.)
Screen 28: A new simulated bid appears in the Market Queue. The price determination rule is reviewed once more
and the subject is asked two more questions (Questions 7 and 8).
Question 7: The seller is asked whether a trade will result if he submits an ask that exceeds the current high bid.
Question 8: The seller is asked what the trade price will be if he submits an ask that is below the current high bid.
Screen 29: The seller is prompted to enter an ask that is at or below the current high bid, in order to produce a
new trade.
Screen 30: Changes to the Current Allocation, Trade Summary, and other screen displays that result from the most
recent trade are reviewed.
Screen 31: The seller is informed of the ‘Vote to End Period’ option, and the unanimity rule that triggers an early
end to the trading phase of the current period.
Screen 32: A Period Proﬁt window appears during the review phase of each period.
Screen 33: Subjects are cautioned that the ask by another seller and the bids by other buyers in the instructions
were simulated and that these may not be similar to the responses by buyers and by other sellers during the
experiment. The subject is informed that he has now completed the instructions and trading will begin when all
subjects have completed their instructions.
Appendix B
Starting from the adjustment process model
∆ˆ dt+1 = −γ ˆ dt + ut+1, (B.1)
if errors are generated by the AR(1) process ut+1 = ρut + ǫt+1, then substitution of ut+1 into equation (B.1) results
in the equation
∆ˆ dt+1 = −γ ˆ dt + ρut + ǫt+1. (B.2)
Equation (B.1) for period t (rather than for period t + 1) is ∆ˆ dt = −γ ˆ dt−1 + ut. Solve this for ut to get ut =
∆ˆ dt + γ ˆ dt−1. When this is substituted into equation (B.2), the result is
∆ˆ dt+1 = −γ ˆ dt + ρ(∆ˆ dt + γ ˆ dt−1) + ǫt+1. (B.3)
This equation, with some minor rearrangement, is equivalent to an equation with lagged price changes on the right
hand side and i.i.d. errors:PRICE DYNAMICS IN AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY 32
∆dt+1 = −γ ˆ dt + ρ(∆ˆ dt + γ ˆ dt−1) + ǫt+1
= −γ ˆ dt + ργ ˆ dt−1 + ρ∆ˆ dt + ǫt+1
= −γ ˆ dt + ργ ˆ dt − ργ ˆ dt + ργ ˆ dt−1 + ρ∆ˆ dt + ǫt+1
= −γ (1 − ρ) ˆ dt − ργ ∆ˆ dt + ρ∆ˆ dt + ǫt+1
= −γ (1 − ρ) ˆ dt − ρ(γ − 1)∆ˆ dt + ǫt+1.